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A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
CREATION OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Thomas E. Bakert
October 1, 1981, marked a milestone in the history of our
federal courts. On that day the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
Reorganization Act of 1980 (Reorganization Act)' divided the
"former fifth circuit" into the "new fifth circuit," composed of the
District of the Canal Zone, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas,
and the new "eleventh circuit," composed of Alabama, Florida,
and Georgia.2 This article describes the legislative history of the
Reorganization Act and summarizes the political and
institutional forces that shaped the landmark statute creating
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.'
The Reorganization Act is a prime example of the
congressional historical preoccupation with altering the middle
tier of the federal courts. Congress recently has been concerned
specifically with the unique problems of the large circuits, those
that have experienced such enormous docket growth that their
effective functioning has been endangered.4 The legislative
history of the division provides further background for5
understanding

the first decade

of the

Eleventh

Circuit.

t Alvin R. Allison Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. B.S.
cum laude 1974, Florida State University; J.D. with high honors 1977, University of
Florida. This article is adapted from a chapter in a forthcoming history of the
Eleventh Circuit commissioned by the Historical Society of the Eleventh Circuit.
THOMAS E. BAKER & J. RALPH BEAIRD, THE FIRsT DECADE: THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, 1981-1991 (forthcoming).
1. Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 41).
2. Id. § 10. The appellations used here are those of Congress.
3. This article is adapted, with permission, from Thomas E. Baker, Precedent
Times Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 34 Sw. L.J. 687 (1981). See
generally DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED-THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM (1988).
4. See generally Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Broundaries-Why the
Proposal To Divide the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Not
Such a Good Idea, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 917 (1990).
5. The literature concerning the creation of the Eleventh Circuit is extensive. See
The Hon. Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr., Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act
of 1980, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 523; Senator Howell Heflin, Fifth Circuit Court of
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Furthermore, this look backward is relevant to the debate now
before Congress over the fate of the largest surviving circuit, the
Ninth Circuit.
For several decades, the Fifth Circuit's surfeited docket had
been the subject of detailed study.6 During the decade of the
1950s and into the early 1960s, the six states of the Fifth Circuit
experienced dramatic population growth, commercialization,
industrialization, and urbanization; these changes transformed
the work of the federal courts in the region.7 The South was
changing and with these changes, new demands were made on
the legal system. The Judicial Conference of the United States
was informed in 1963 that its committees on court
administration and judicial statistics had agreed on the need for
additional judges in the Fifth Circuit, but had disagreed as to the
8
best way in which to accomplish the increase in judgepower.
The Judicial Conference formed an ad hoc committee to study the
geographical organization of the federal courts. In its 1964
report, the ad hoc committee recommended a division of the Fifth
Circuit into a new fifth circuit composed of Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, and Mississippi and a new eleventh circuit composed of
Louisiana, Texas, and the Canal Zone. 9 In that year the Judicial
Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980-Overdue Relief for an Overworked Court, 11
CuMB. L. REV. 597 (1980-1981); The Hon. Albert Tate, Jr., The Last Year of the 'Old'
Fifth (1891-1981), 27 LoY. L. REV. 689 (1981). See generally BARROW & WALKER,
supra note 3.
6. Until its division, the Fifth Circuit led all discussions of overcrowded dockets of
the courts of appeals. As early as 1950, one commentator noted the rising caseload of
the Fifth Circuit and suggested splitting it into a new eleventh circuit composed of
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, and a new fifth
circuit composed of the Canal Zone, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. John H. Wahl,
Jr., The Case for an Eleventh Court of Appeals, 24 FLA. L.J. 233 (1950). For other
early commentary with suggested solutions for congested dockets, see generally Paul
D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969); Charles R.
Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals,
1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 257; Frederick B. Wiener, Federal Regional Courts: Solution for
the Certiorari Dilemma, 49 A.B.A. J. 1169 (1963); Charles A. Wright, The Overloaded
Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration, 42 TEX. L. REV. 949 (1964). For a
novel suggestion for relieving the courts of appeals, see Donald P. Lay, A Proposal
for Discretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeals, 35 Sw. L.J. 1151 (1981). For a
comparative analysis of the Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits, see J.
WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COUiTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM

(1981).
See BARRON & WALKER, supra note 3, at 2-3.
8. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
7.

STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 184, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1963).
9. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
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Conference initiated a policy of making comprehensive surveys of
the business of the circuits and districts every four years. As a
result of the 1964 survey and the resulting recommendations,
Congress added four temporary judges to the Fifth Circuit in
1966, raising the total number of judges on the court to
thirteen.'0 The temporary judgeships were made permanent and
two others were added in 1968" to "alleviate... a crisis
situation"; Congress was convinced that the action
2 was necessary
survey.'
1968
scheduled
the
await
not
could
and
As serious as the problem had been when originally noted, it
only worsened as study and debate lengthened. The parade of
horrible statistics lengthened with each new appraisal of the
situation. 13 Between 1950 and the mid-1960s, appellate filings
in the Fifth Circuit had more than doubled. 4 By the mid-1970s,
the total was roughly eight times the 1950 level.' 5 Congress
14-15 (1964). The report prompted Prof. Charles Alan Wright to observe that "[t]he
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is at a point of crisis." Wright,
supra note 6, at 949. In May 1964, then-Chief Justice Warren addressed the
American Law Institute and urged the passage of corrective legislation. Chief Justice
Earl Warren, Address Before the American Law Institute Annual Meeting (May 20,
1964), quoted in The Hon. Lewis R. Morgan, The Fifth Circuit: Expand or Divide, 29
MERCER L. REV. 885, 886 (1978). The resulting ALI study had little to say about the
courts of appeals, but instead focused on reductions in original jurisdictions.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS (1969). An ABA Report published the year before had focused
on federal appellate courts, but emphasized efficiency reform and suggested sequential
reforms for structural changes. AM. B. FOUND., ACCOMMODATING THE WORKLOAD OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (1968); see also BARRON & WALKER, supra
note 3, at 7-11, 62-67.
10. The President was authorized to appoint four judges immediately with the
limitation that the next four vacancies on the court would go unfilled. Act of March
18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-372, 80 Stat. 75. See generally S. REP. NO. 782, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2086. The previous increase had occurred in
1961. Act of May 19, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-36, 75 Stat. 80. See generally H.R. REP.
NO. 215, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1729; CONF. REP. No.
342, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1743. The docket increase
between 1954 and 1961 clearly demonstrated that seven years was too long to wait
between evaluations. See Act of February 10, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-294, 68 Stat. 8.
11. Act of June 18, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-347, 82 Stat. 184.
12. S. REP. No. 782, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2086,
2087. The court had been operating with the equivalent of 15 judges by arranging for
visiting judges to sit. Thus, the 1968 legislation did not decrease the Fifth Circuit's
caseload per judge, which was then the highest among the courts of appeals. Id. at
2089.
13. Reports and statistical summaries were in abundance. Baker, supra note 3, at
notes 77, 80, 84, 140.
14. The Hon. Thomas G. Gee, The Imminent Destruction of the Fifth Circuit; Or,
How Not to Deal with a Blossoming Docket, 9 TEX. TECH L. REV. 799 (1978).
15. Id. Then-Judge Gee is careful to point out, however, that the actual workload
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simply could not add judges fast enough to keep the court afloat.
With these developments, Congress crashed the "nine judge
barrier," which in judicial administration once had the same
mystique as the sound barrier once had in aeronautics. Many
judges and members of Congress almost mystically believed that
the Supreme Court total of nine members was the absolute
maximum number of judges16 that could operate efficiently and
coherently as a single court.
In 197017 Chief Justice Warren E. Burger urged that
Congress create a commission to study and re-examine the
structure of the federal court system.' 8 The Judicial Conference
made a similar recommendation in the same year. 19 Responding
to the collective urging of the Judicial Conference, the Federal
Judicial Center, the American Bar Association, and the chief
judges of all eleven circuits, Congress created the Commission on
Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System in 1972. 20 The
Commission was charged with conducting a broad study of the
federal judicial system's geographical divisions, structure, and

did not increase eight times in the 15 year period. Id.
16. See BARROW & WALKER, supra note 3, at 5; see also Gee, supra note 14, at 64.
17. During the five years between 1965 and 1970, the issue of dividing the Fifth
Circuit was debated in the Congressional hallways and in judicial chambers. For a
detailed account of this period of in-fighting, which for the most part was hidden
from public view, see BARROW & WALKER, supra note 3, at 121-52.

18. Chief Justice Burger repeatedly urged Congress to grant meaningful relief to
the federal courts. See, e.g., Chief Justice Burger, 1977 Report to the American Bar
Association, 68 A.B.A. J. 504 (1977). Under Chief Justice Burger's aegis, the Federal
Judicial center had appointed the so-called Freund Committee of jurists, scholars, and
attorneys to study the caseload of the Supreme Court. The 1972 Report, which
recommended a screening court to refer cases to the Supreme Court, met with a
hailstorm of controversy. Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme
Court, 57 F.RID. 573 (1972).
19. S. REP. No. 117, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3569,
3601.
20. Act of October 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807. See generally CONF.
REP. No. 92-1457, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3611. The
Senate Report described the caseload explosion and listed some alternative solutions,
which included creating more circuit judgeships, dividing circuits, realigning the
boundaries of all the circuits, abolishing all circuit boundaries, and creating
substantive law division in large circuits. S. REP. No. 92-930, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3602, 3605-06. Congress was convinced that a real
crisis could be avoided until 1975, which would give the Commission time to operate.
Id. at 3610. See generally Hearings Before Subcommittee of the House Committee on
the Judiciary on H.R. No. 7378, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); A. Leo Levin & Arlene
Fickler, Realignment of the Fifth Circuit: A Necessary First Step, 46 MiSS. L.J. 659
(1975).
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internal procedures and with recommending such changes as
and effective
would be "most appropriate for
21 the expeditious
disposition of judicial business."
The Commission conducted extensive hearings 22 and filed its
report on the geographical realignment of the circuits in
December 1973. Rather than suggesting a complete realignment
of the circuits, the Commission recommended that the Fifth
Circuit be divided so that Alabama, Florida, and Georgia would
be grouped in one circuit and Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas
in another. This recommendation satisfied the Commission's selfimposed criteria: (1) circuits should be composed of at least three
states; (2) no circuit should be created that would immediately
require more than nine judges; (3) a circuit should contain states
with a diversity of population, legal business, and socioeconomic
interests; (4) realignment should avoid excessive interference in
established circuit alignment; and (5) no circuit should contain
noncontiguous statesY The Commission also proposed two
alternatives: an alignment of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and
Mississippi and a second alignment of Arkansas, Louisiana, and
Texas; and an alignment of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 24and
Mississippi and a second alignment of Louisiana and Texas.
21. Act of October 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807. In the view of some
of those in the best position to know, the Commission was "foredoomed to fail"
because it was prohibited from considering jurisdictional reforms. Gee, supra note 14,
at 803; The Hon. John M. Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 LOY. L. REV. 787
(1980). See generally THE HON. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A
GENERAL VIEW (1973); Austin Sarat, The Role of Courts and the Logic of Court
Reform: Notes on the Justice Department's Approach to Improving Justice, 64 JuD. 300
(1981).
22. See generally COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE
SYSTEM, HEARINGS (1973) [hereinafter 1973 COMMISSION HEARINGS]; BARROW &
WALKER, supra note 3, at 161-71.
23. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The
Geographical Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendations for
Change, 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973) [hereinafter Commission on Revision]. The Commission
recognized that the boundaries were "largely the result of historical accident," but
declined to recommend nationwide reorganization because of its unsettling effects. Id.
at 228. The Commission also recommended the division of the Ninth Circuit. See
generally Arthur D. Hellman, Legal Problems of Dividing a State Between Federal
Judicial Circuits, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1188 (1974). The Commission later issued a
second report. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System,
Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195
(1975). This second report suggested a need for a new National Court of Appeals, an
idea proposed three years earlier by the so-called Freund Committee under the
auspices of the Federal Judicial Center. See supra note 18.
24. Commission on Revision, supra note 23, at 233-34.
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The Fifth Circuit was the obvious starting place for the
proposed realignment and reform.2 Its problems with size and
caseload were largest, and attempts to alleviate them by
appointing more judges 26 and instituting controversial
procedural innovations 27 already had been tried. Although its
judges were unanimously opposed to adding more judgeships,
they had voted overwhelmingly in favor of a split.28 The
inevitability of a backlog was being suggested.' The Senate
reacted with the introduction of three bills, each tracking one of
the three alternatives offered by the Commission.3° The
Subcommitee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on the three
bills and received the comments and criticisms of lawyers and
judges. Instead of the circuit-splitting approach taken by the
Commission and adopted in the three bills, the Subcommittee's
1974 draft report proposed3 an internal reorganization of the Fifth
Circuit into two divisions. 1

25. The Commission "harborfed] no illusions that realignment [was] a sufficient
remedy, adequate even for a generation, to deal with the fundamental problems now
confronting the Courts of Appeals." Id. at 229. Realigning the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits, however, was believed to be a necessary first effort to cope with their
pressing problems." Id.
26. See supra notes 6-13.
27. See generally George K. Rahdert & Larry M. Roth, Inside the Fifth Circuit:
Looking at Some of its Internal Procedures, 23 LOY. L. REv. 661 (1977); Philip
Shuchman & Alan Gelfand, The Use of Local Rule 21 in the Fifth Circuit: Can
Judges Select Cases of "No Precedential Value"?, 29 EMORY L.J. 195 (1980). By the
mid-1970s, the Fifth Circuit was deciding approximately 55% of its cases without oral
argument. See Rahdert & Roth, supra, at 668; see also Fifth Cir. R. 18 (1981). It also
was disposing of approximately 35% of its cases without a written opinion. See
Schuchman & Gelfand, at 220; see also Fifth Cir. R. 21 (1981); see also Thomas E.
Baker, A Compendium of Proposals to Reform the United States Courts of Appeals, 37
U. FLA. L. REv. 225 (1985).
28. Despite dramatic increases in caseload, the judges of the Fifth Circuit adopted
a resolution in October 1971 against adding judgeships. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS 82 (1971). Instead, they favored a
split. See S. REP. No. 117, supra note 19, at 20-24; Written Joint Statement of Judges
Gewin, Morgan, Clark, Coleman, Godbol, Syer, Simpson and Bell, 1973 COMMISSION
HEARINGS, supra note 22, at 392-95; Levin & Fickler, supra note 20, at 667-73.
29. Hearings on S. 729 Before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1975).
30. See S. 2988, 2989, 2990, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
31. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 19, at 40. Internal reorganization of the circuit
into divisions arose as a response to objections to splitting the Fifth Circuit, including
a concern over which new circuit would be called the Fifth. Splitting goes against the
long-standing tradition of the circuit. See supra note 5. Confused resistance had been
expressed for grouping Mississippi with the civil law state of Louisiana and with
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This so-called internal division approach to the reorganization
of the Fifth Circuit was translated into a Senate bill on which
hearings were held in 1975.2 The substituted bill called for
internally reorganizing the Fifth Circuit into two divisions: the
Eastern Division, with twelve judges, would have included
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and the Canal Zone; the Western
Division, with eleven judges, would have included Louisiana and
Texas.3 3 The two divisions would have had similar caseloads.
Each would have had its own chief judge, clerk, circuit executive,
and judicial council. The substituted bill proposed some limited
continuity for the new divisions, including a special joint .en banc
hearing before the most senior judges of the two divisions to
settle interpretive conflicts in the decisions of the two divisions, a
provision for a single judicial conference, and interdivision
assignment of district and circuit judges to accommodate caseload
demands. 34
Still, the net effect of the substituted bill was to create two
new circuit courts. The substituted bill1 thus departed from the
Commission's recommended proposal in two significant

Texas. Another fear was the creation of an oil and gas law circuit, with Louisiana
and Texas dominating one circuit. See Gee, supra note 14, at 803-06. The splitting
approach also involved the unique problems of the Ninth Circuit, and the problems of
dividing one state, California, between two circuits. That proposal died quickly. See
Charles R. Haworth, Circuit Splitting and the 'New" National Court of Appeals: Can
the Mouse Roar?, 30 Sw. L.J. 839 (1976). No bill was reported by the Judiciary
Committee of either house in 1973 because the events of Watergate preempted
committee activities. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 19, at 8.
32. S. 729, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See generally Haworth, supra note 6, at
843-54; Levin & Fickler, supra note 20. Because of strong resistance to dividing the
Ninth Circuit and the State of California, the bill reported favorably by the
Committee in December 1975 applied only to the Fifth Circuit. S. 2752, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975); see S. REP. No. 513, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 15 (1975); see also
BARROW & WALKER, supra note 3, at 171-81.
33. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 19, at 41. The court had supported division into
two autonomous circuits by a vote of ten to three. Two judgeships were vacant. The
judges also requested that twelve additional judgeships be authorized and divided
ratably between the two new circuits. Id.
34. The special en banc hearing was to be used in the event of a "conflict with a
decision by the other division of that circuit and affecting the validity, construction,
or application of any statute or administrative order, rule, or regulation, State or
Federal, which affects personal or property rights in the same State." S. 729, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
35. S. 2752, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (Fifth Circuit Divisions), substituted for S.
729, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (Fifth and Ninth Circuit Divisions), substituted for
S. 2988, 2989, 2990, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (Commission recommended splitting
of Fifth and Ninth Circuits); see supra notes 22-24.
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particulars. First, it adopted the Commission's second alternative
grouping, with Mississippi aligned with Alabama, Florida, and
Georgia.36 More importantly, the substituted bill created
divisions within the Fifth Circuit in lieu of two new, completely
autonomous circuits.37 Despite the pressing need for relief,
political inaction in the 94th Congress brought the matter to an
anticlimactic close. The Fifth Circuit enjoyed a well-deserved
reputation as a bastion of civil rights in the South.3 The court's
civil rights workload, however, pushed and pulled the debate over
division. Civil rights suits swelled the docket numerically and "in
ways that cannot be measured statistically; the time that
appellate judges put into the supervision of these cases went far
beyond the proportion that the cases represented of the old Fifth
Circuit's total caseload." 39 Thus, civil rights cases contributed to
the workload pressure for division. At the same time, some
concern was expressed that the Fifth Circuit's leadership role in
civil rights could be compromised by division, 4 °and several
organizations opposed division for that very reason.

36. The Commission had propounded even the alternatives as "a significant
improvement over the current situation." Commission on Revision, supra note 23, at
233.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24. While recommending legislation to
divide the Fifth Circuit, the Department of Justice suggested that the divisions were
really two autonomous circuits and should be designated as such so that all ties
between the two would be broken. S. REP. No. 117, supra 19, at 42. The Louisiana
Bar Association also supported creation of two new circuits of three states each. Id.
38. See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981); FRANK T. READ & LUCY S.
MCGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL. INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH
(1978).
39. Burke Marshall, Book Review, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1241 (1989).
40. Concern was raised that realignment might affect the conservative or liberal
tendencies of the court generally. The Senate Judiciary Committee found no factual
basis for such concerns. S. REP. No. 117, supra note 19, at 46 (citing Haworth, supra
note 6). See generally Haworth, supra note 6, at 847-54. Partisan politics may have
played a role. Congress in 1975 was controlled by Democrats; the White House was
Republican, and a presidential election was imminent. While legislation affecting the
judicial structure is often nonpartisan, the prospect of wholesale judicial appointments
generates intense political interest. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE SUPREME
COURT, A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 42 (1927); see also BARROW &
WALKER, supra note 3, at 184-89.
After the 94th Congress adjourned, judicial statistics for 1975 became available
and showed still another increase in case filings. In addition, the Judicial Conference
made its quadrennial survey of judgeships and recommended that more be created. S.
REP. No. 117, supra note 19, at 8. Various other bills to add judges died during the
same session. Id.
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Both the House and the Senate in the 94th Congress took up
bills realigning the Fifth Circuit. Because each chamber passed a
different version, both of which substantially increased the
number of district and circuit judgeships in the Fifth Circuit and
throughout the country, the bills were forced to go to a
conference committee." Under the Senate version, the Fifth

Circuit would be divided into two separate circuits. The fourteen
judges of the new fifth circuit would hold court for Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and the Canal Zone, and the twelve
judges of the new eleventh circuit would do the same for
Louisiana and Texas.42 The House bill would have increased the
number of judges43in the circuit, but did not provide for splitting
the Fifth Circuit.
Once the conference committee began work on the House and
Senate bills, profound disagreement immediately became
apparent." The Senate plan would have violated the
Commission's criteria by isolating two states in a single circuit
and by creating two new circuits with more than nine judges.45
Civil rights proponents once again expressed their concern that
the proposed new fifth circuit would be composed only of more
conservative, deep south judges.46 Concern also was raised that
the proposed
new eleventh circuit would become an oil and gas
47
circuit.

The conference committee labored long and hard over a
compromise. A plan was offered to appoint the additional judges

41. H.R. 7843, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. 11, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977).
42. S. 11, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977). For a dialogue by two Fifth Circuit judges
on the merits of S. 11, see Gee, supra note 14, and Morgan, supra note 9. See also
BARROW & WALKER, supra note 3, at 189-95.
43. H.R. 7843, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H. CONF. REP. No. 1643, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. at 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3618; see also BARROW & WALKER,
supra note 3, at 195-210.
44. For an account of some of the compromise efforts, see 36 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1416
(June 3, 1978), 36 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1854 (July 22, 1978), 36 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2579
(Sept. 23, 1978), and 36 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2960 (Oct. 14, 1978). See generally, BARROW
& WALKER, supra note 3, at 210-18; Thomas M. Reavley, The Split of the Fifth
Circuit: Update and Finis, 12 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1981).
45. See supra text accompanying note 23.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40; 36 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2579 (Sept. 23,
1978); see also Osmond K. Fraenkel, The Function of the Lower Federal Courts as
Protectors of Civil Liberties, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 132 (1948); Frank T. Read,
The Bloodless Revolution: The Role of the Fifth Circuit in the Integration of the Deep
South, 32 MERCER L. REV. 1149 (1981).
47. See Reavley, supra note 44, at 3-4.
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and wait one year after the appointment of the last judge for
reports from the court and the Judicial Conference. 8 Another
compromise, offered to disarm the objection from the civil rights
groups, was to create a special forum to decide conflicts between
the two new circuits. The special forum was to be composed of
the seventeen most senior active judges, nine from the present
court, four from the proposed new fifth circuit, and four from the
proposed new eleventh circuit.4 9 In the closing hours of the 95th
Congress, Attorney General Griffin Bell, a former member of the
Fifth Circuit, mediated a compromise that allowed both sides to
claim victory. 5° In addition to creating the new judgeships, 51
section 6 of the statute provided:
Any court of appeals having more than 15 active judges may
constitute itself into administrative units complete with such
facilities and staff as may be prescribed by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and may
perform its en banc function by such number of members of
its en banc courts as may be prescribed by rule of the court of
appeals.5 2

48. 36 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1416, 1417-18 (June 3, 1978).
49. BARROW & WALKER, supra note 3, at 215-18; 36 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1854 (July
22, 1978).
50. BARROW & WALKER, supra note 3, at 215-18. One Senate aide was quoted as
saying, "It was a real cop-out by both the House and Senate conferees to get the
They can interpret it to mean anything
judgeships and the political patronage ....
they want." 36 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2579 (Sept. 23, 1978) (omissions in original).
Congressman McClory, a member of the conference committee, labeled § 6
"intentionally ambiguous language." 124 CONG. REC. Hll, 471-72 (daily ed. Oct. 4,
1978). See CONG. REC. 32,339 (Sept. 28, 1978); CONG. REC. 33,507 (Oct. 4, 1978).
51. A total of 152 district and circuit judgeships were created, the largest number
ever established by a single act of Congress. 36 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2961 (Oct. 14,
1978).
52. Act of October 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (Supp. II 1978)). Only the Fifth and Ninth Circuits then satisfied

the fifteen judge requirement. The Ninth Circuit adopted an administrative unit plan,
dividing itself into three units on Dec. 10, 1979. After circulating the proposal to
interested members of the Ninth Circuit bar, the court also adopted a plan for a
modified en banc court consisting of the Chief Judge and ten additional judges to be

drawn by lot. Letter from Chief Judge James R. Browning, United States
Appeals, Ninth Circuit (May 9, 1980). See 9th Cir. R 23, 25 (1980); cf. 28
2109 (1976) (if no Supreme Court quorum exists, case is remitted to the
appeals of origin for final resolution by either the en banc court or

Court of
U.S.C. §
court of
a court

constituted of the three most senior judges). See generally Baker, supra note 4, at

928-32; An Interview with Chief Judge Browning of the Ninth Circuit, THE THIRD
BRANCH, May 1981, at 1.
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In essence, the committee
5 3 thus had left initial resolution of the
issue to the court itself.
The Fifth Circuit Judicial Council promptly appointed an ad
hoc committee to consider this section of the Omnibus Judgeship
Act of 1978 and the prospects of internal reorganization into
administrative units and revision of the en banc procedure.'
The court's committee heard the views of each judge on both
issues.55 In June 1979 the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council tabled
the matter until more than sixteen active judges were in place,
and it was set for consideration at the September 1979
session. 56 At that session, twenty-two active judges debated the
issues, and "it became obvious that there were many differences
of opinion about what should be done." 57 The majority agreed
that the court could not split itself by rule after Congress had
explicitly rejected the split legislation.58 Because Congress chose
to maintain the Fifth Circuit as one court, it would be governed
by one rule of law.5 9 As the judges themselves would soon
conclude, the congressional decision to maintain one law of the
circuit was sound in theory, 6° but so burdensome as to be
practically impossible without a division of the circuit.
Continuation of the en banc function after the internal
reorganization of the circuit into administrative units threatened
to endanger the notion of one law of the circuit. Several proposals
were considered to alleviate the difficulties presented. One
suggestion was that each administrative unit, east and west,
have its own en banc court, but this approach raised the

53. The committee requested reports from the judicial council of the court and the
Judicial Conference one year after the appointment of the last judge on "what rules
have been implemented . . . how those rules are working, and recommendations for
such additional legislation as may be necessary to provide for the effective and
expeditious administration and disposition of the business of that court." H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 1643, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978).
54. Reavley, supra note 44, at 4.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. The Judicial Conference apparently drew support for this conclusion from
Congress's use in § 6 of the term "administrative units" rather than "judicial units."
Id.; see Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 41 (Supp. II 1978).
59. See 124 CONG. REC. S17, 515-17 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1978) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy); 124 CONG. REC. Hl, 473-74 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1978) (remarks of Rep.

Rodino).
60. See infra note 71.
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problems of whether one en banc court would bind the other and
how to resolve conflicts between the two en banc courts. One
solution*would have created a "grande en banc" from the entire
circuit to resolve such conflicts.6 ' This proposal ultimately was
deemed unacceptable because it would have added another year
to the appellate process and would have postponed, not solved,
the original problems of a twenty-six member court.62
Because an en banc court of twenty-six judges was deemed a
problem in itself, several proposals suggested the creation of a
permanent en banc court of a smaller number, selected either by
lot or by seniority.6 3 This proposal was rejected because it would
impair the court's collegiality by establishing classes of judges
and would deny nonparticipating judges an important judicial
function.' Another proposal, which would have provided for
random selection of the en banc court for each sitting, failed
because a fortuitous selection process could reduce en banc
precedent to the "luck of the draw."65 Such a result would have
had serious consequences for the rule of one law for the circuit.
This commitment to maintaining one rule of law in the circuit
left few alternatives, and no court consensus could be reached.
The September 1979 Judicial Council decided to postpone action
under section 6 for one year,66 but the court soon became
impatient with its self-imposed moratorium and reconsidered
section 6 at its May 1980 Judicial Council. Apparently, "the
impetus for the split was.., the chaos of the en banc hearings
and decisions in twelve cases presented in January 1980."6 A
judge who participated described the first en banc
session of the
69
court, in which twenty-four judges participated:
Special physical arrangements were necessary; a two-tiered
bench was prepared to accommodate the members of the

61. Reavley, supra note 44, at 5.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 5-6.
64. The suggestion was made that such a permanent solution would deprive the
non-participating judges of their judicial office unconstitutionally without House
impeachment and Senate removal. See id,"see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
65. Reavley, supra note 44, at 6.

66. Id. at 7.
67. Id.; see also Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 524 n.6; Judge 27oflat: Sentencing

Reform Bill Will Allow Apellate Review, Limit Parole, THE THIRD BRANCH, Apr. 1983,
at 1, 3-4.
68. Marshall, supra note 39, at 1245.
69. Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 526.
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court for en banc oral arguments. Later, in the conference of
the judges, obtaining a consensus presented considerable
difficulty. On cases under consideration, meetings in which
the sitting judges expressed their views became long. The
writing of the opinion was also a protracted process. The
opinion was first assigned to a member of the court to be
written and then slowly circulated among the judges for
consensus. Inevitably there were accompanying dissents and
special concurrences. The time required to reach a result
became excessive.70

For the first time, the Council voted unanimously to petition
71
Congress and request the creation of two autonomous circuits.
The Judicial Council also arranged the court into two
administrative units: Unit A, composed of Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Texas; and Unit B, composed of Alabama, Florida, and
Georgia.7 2 The unity of the en banc court, the judicial

conference, and the judicial council were maintained. This had
something of a "localizing effect" on the court and "[t]o some
extent, the functioning

of the separate

units

served as

a

73
rehearsal for the split of the circuit."
The unanimous May 5, 1980 petition from the Judicial Council
triggered a quick congressional response.74 Senate Bill 2830,

which would have split the Fifth Circuit, passed the Senate on

June 18, 1980. 7' House Bill 7665, which ultimately was enacted,
created the new Fifth Circuit, composed of the Canal Zone,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, and the new Eleventh Circuit,
composed of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia.7 6 Testimony at the

70. Id. One case had a majority opinion, a two-judge concurring opinion, a second
seven-judge concurring opinion, an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in, part
joined by eleven judges, and an eight-judge dissent. See generally BARROW & WALKER,
supra note 3, at 230-37.
71. The collective sense of the gathering was that this was the only solution.
Telephone interview with Chief Judge J.P. Coleman, United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit (May 14, 1980).
72. A committee was appointed to smooth the transition. IcL; see Fifth Cir. R 1
(1981). Judges of each unit generally were to sit together in panels for that unit,
.although the authority of judges to act as members of this Court throughout this
circuit shall in no way be diminished." Id.
73. H. CROUCH, A HISTORY OF THE FiFrH CIRCUIT 1891-1981 191 (1983).
74. See generally Ainsworth, supra note 5; Heflin, supra note 5; Tate, supra note 5.
75. S. 2830, 96 Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
76. H.R. 7665, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), was introduced on June 25, 1980. The
only difference between H.R 7665 and S. 2830 was that the Senate version placed
the Canal Zone in the new Eleventh Circuit. Both versions divided the states as
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committee hearings, held in August 1980, unanimously favored
the proposals." The earlier concerns for civil rights implications
were allayed. 8
The House Report described several reasons for splitting the
Fifth Circuit. 7 9 The committee cited the court's enormity in
geography, in population, in docket, and in judgeships as
diseconomies of scale.80 Ironically, the congressional solution of

requested in the Judicial Conference's petition.
77. The following organizations supported the judges' unanimous petition for
splitting the court: U.S. Department of Justice; American Bar Association; Commission
on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System; Judicial Council of the Fifth
Circuit; Federal Bar Association; National Association of Attorneys General; Attorneys
General of the six states within the Fifth Circuit; Delegates from the State of
Georgia to the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference, 1980; Delegates from the State of
Alabama to the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference, 1980; Delegates from the State of
Texas to the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference, 1980; Delegates from the State of
Florida to the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference, 1980; Delegates from the State of
Louisiana to the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference, 1980; Delegates from the State of
Mississippi to the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference, 1980; United States Magistrates
of the Fifth Circuit; District Judges' Association of the Fifth Circuit (consisting of 110
district judges); Bankruptcy Judges of the Fifth Circuit; Mississippi Bar Association;
Florida Bar Board of Governors; State Bar of Georgia; Houston, Texas Bar
Association; Mobile, Alabama Bar Association; New York Times; and Alabama Black
Lawyers Association.
78. Several influential groups withdrew their prior opposition: American Civil
Liberties Union; Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; Alabama Black
Lawyers Association; and NAACP Legal Defense Fund. BARROW & WALKER, supra
note 3, at 241. See generally id. at 230-45.
The expressed concern of civil rights supporters for the perpetuation of an allwhite judiciary in the south was recognized. The committee, however, deemed the
fear overcome by affirmative action guidelines in judicial selection. H.R. REP. NO.
1390, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4236, 4239-40. See
generally Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 6060, H.R.
7665, and Related Bills, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R.
7665]; BARROW & WALKER, supra note 3, at 238.
79. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1390, supra note 78.
80. Id. at 2-4. The geographical size of the six states in the Fifth Circuit had not
changed since 1891, when it became one of the original circuits. Act of March 3,
1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. Indeed, modern means of transportation have made
riding circuit much less onerous than in the past, albeit more expensive. Total
population in the area covered by the Fifth Circuit, at the time of the split,
approached 40 million. The future docket predictions were staggering. H.R. REP. No.
1390, supra note 78, at 2. With the addition of 35 district court judges in the
Omnibus Judgeship Bill of 1978, Fifth Circuit filings were to have reached 5,380 by
1982. Even with the split, the dockets of each of the two new circuits would be
larger than any other circuit except the Ninth: in 1980 the states of the new Fifth
Circuit had 2,301 filings and the states of the new Eleventh Circuit had 1,919.
Fourteen judges would sit in the new Fifth Circuit; twelve judges would sit in the
new Eleventh Circuit. Id. at 4 n.9. The committee's principal emphasis was the near
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1978,81 adding judges, had become the precipitous problem in
1980. Emphasizing the need for "uniformity in the application of
the law by the Court,"8 2 the committee concluded that more

intracircuit conflicts were inevitable with so many multiples of
panels. The en banc process, which otherwise would remedy
internal conflicts, had become so difficult, time consuming, and
cumbersome that its effectiveness had suffered.83 Eleventh
Circuit Chief Judge Tjoflat, a former district judge who had
served on the former Fifth Circuit, later put it simply:
One of the biggest problems facing the federal judiciary is the
instability of the rule of law that results when we create
great numbers of additional judgeships. The more judges we
create at the appellate level, the larger we make courts of
appeals, the more unstable the law becomes. If you have
three judges on a court of appeals, the law is stable. It is
stable for litigants, lawyers, and district judges. The outcome
of a suit, should one be filed, is predictable. When you add
the fourth judge to that court, you add some instability to the
rule of law in that circuit because another point of view is
added to the decision making. When you add the fifth judge,
the sixth judge, when you get as large as the old Fifth Circuit
was, with twenty-six judges, the law becomes extremely
unstable. One of several thousand different panel
combinations will decide the case, will interpret the law.
Even if the court has a rule, as we did in the old Fifth, that
one panel cannot overrule another, a court of twenty-six will
8
still produce irreconcilable statements of the law. 4
Thus, because Congress could not agree upon a solution to the
circuit's problems, it had delegated the task of dealing with the
problem to the court, which itself could not agree upon a unified
approach; the resulting judicial impasse at last precipitated
congressional action.

impossibility of so

many judges

functioning

as

an

en

banc

court,

maintaining

uniformity in the law of the circuit, and coping effectively with the burgeoning output
of so large a court. Id. at 3.
81. Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (codified at
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see supra text accompanying notes 41-53.
82. H.R. REP. No. 1390, supra note 78, at 3.
83. Id.
84. 2

ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL. JUDICIARY,

11th Circuit,

at 4 (1988)

(quoting

Judge Tioflat: Sentencing Reform Bill Will Allow Appellate Review, Limit Parole, THE
THIRD BRANCH, Apr. 1983, at 1, 3-4).
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Consistent with long tradition, traced above, the Congress
continued its preoccupation with the middle tier of the federal
judiciary with passage of the Fifth Circuit Reorganization Act of
1980, which became effective on October 1, 1981. 85 After three
decades of debate and study, the Fifth Circuit was finally
divided, temporarily leaving three courts where there had been
only one. Eventually, two courts survived: the new Fifth Circuit
and the new Eleventh Circuit. According to the definitional
section of the Reorganization Act, on the effective date of the Act,
three courts coexisted within the confines of the former Fifth
Circuit. 86 First, the "former fifth circuit," defined as "fifth
judicial circuit of the United States as in existence on the day
before the effective date,"8 7 continued to exist in two situations.
If the matter was submitted for decision before the effective date
of the Act, s8 or if a petition was made for rehearing or for
rehearing en banc in a matter decided or submitted before the
effective date, 89 the matter will be processed as if the Act had
not been enacted.' The "former fifth circuit" ceased to exist on
July 1, 1984.9 ' Secondly, the Act created the "new fifth circuit,"
defined as the fifth judicial circuit established by amending its
composition to include the District of the Canal Zone, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas. 92 Thirdly, the Act establishes the

85. Pub. L. No. 96-452 § 12, 94 Stat. 1991, 1996 (1980) [hereinafter Reorganization
Act].
86. For a codification of the current geographical division of the circuit courts of
appeals, see 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1976). Since the courts of appeals were created in 1891,
the Fifth Circuit had been comprised of the states of Alabaria, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas. Act of March 3, 1892, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. These
six states had been grouped together since 1866 when the circuit courts were
reorganized. Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209.
87. Reorganization Act, supra note 85, § 10(1).
88. Id. § 9(1). "Submitted" includes cases in which "oral argument has been heard
or . . . the case has otherwise been submitted to a panel for decision." H.R. REP. No.
1390, supra note 78, at 8.
89. Reorganization Act, supra note 85, § 9(3). This subsection preserved all rights
to petitions for hearing in matters decided or submitted before the effective date.
H.R. REP. No. 1390, supra note 78, at 8.
90. Reorganization Act, supra note 85, § 9(1), (3); H.R. REP. No. 1390, supra note
78, at 8.
91. Reorganization Act, supra note 85, § 11. The transition period also allows the
former Fifth Circuit broad administrative discretion to resolve unforeseen
developments. H.R. REP. No. 1390, supra note 78, at 9.
92. Reorganization Act, supra note 85, § 10(2). This is "the Fifth Circuit created"
by the Act. H.R. REP. No. 1390, supra note 78, at 9 (emphasis added).
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"eleventh circuit," defined as the "newly created"9 3 eleventh4
judicial circuit composed of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia.
Thus, at least for a short time and for limited purposes, the
former court continued to 95exist, to be joined and ultimately
replaced by two new courts.
This legislative division raised no small question for stare
decisis: what would be the precedential value of former Fifth
Circuit case law in the new Eleventh Circuit?' Court watchers
did not have to wait long for an Eleventh Circuit answer to the
question. A unanimous en banc court, in Bonner v. City of
97 ruled on the issue in the first appeal to be heard
Prichard,
and the first opinion to be published by the new court. The
Eleventh Circuit held:
[The decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit (the "former Fifth" or the "old Fifth"), as that
court existed on September 30, 1981, handed down by that
court prior to the close of business on that date, shall be
binding as precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, for this court,
the district courts, and the bankruptcy courts in the
circuit. 98

First, the en banc court committed the new Eleventh Circuit to
the absolute rule of interpanel accord-by which one panel is
obliged to follow the holdings of previous panels-a rule that had
been followed in the former Fifth Circuit. 9 Second, the court
rejected the tabula rasa of beginning to judge in a new circuit
without precedent."° The judges concluded, "We choose instead
to begin on a stable, fixed, and identifiable base while
maintaining the capacity for change." w1 ' Finally, the court
93. Reorganization Act, supra note 85, § 10(2).
94. Id. § 10(3).
95. Additionally, the Reorganization Act (1) specified the number of active judges
for each new circuit (14 for the new Fifth Circuit and 12 for the new Eleventh
Circuit), id. § 4; (2) assigned the regular active judges to the respective new circuits,
id. § 5; (3) provided senior judges with an option to be assigned to either new circuit,
id. § 6; (4) specified the seniority of the judges within each new circuit, id. § 7; and
(5) authorized the new Eleventh Circuit to hold court in the New Orleans courthouse
until its own new quarters in Atlanta were complete, id. § 8. See generally H.R. REP.
No. 1390, supra note 78, at 6-9.
96. See generally Baker, supra note 3.
97. 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
98. Id. at 1207.
99. Id. at 1209.
100. Id. at 1211.
101. Id. Both appellant and appellees in Bonner urged the adoption of the former
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selected the en banc decision in Bonner as a vehicle to transfer
former Fifth Circuit precedent into the new court's jurisprudence
as the foundation for building its own stare decisis. °2 The new
Eleventh Circuit likewise adopted new rules which were taken
from the former Fifth Circuit and simplified and
consolidated. 10 3
And so judicial history was made. The House Report
summarized the Congressional hope for the new Fifth Circuit and
the new Eleventh Circuit:
The goal of the legislation is to meet societal change and
growing caseloads in the six States presently comprising the
Fifth Circuit. It accomplishes this by providing the residents,
attorneys and litigants who reside or litigate within those
States with a new Federal judicial structure which is capable
of meeting the clear mandates of our judicial system-the
rendering of consistent, expeditious, fair and inexpensive
justice. The two new circuits will preserve and promote the
vigor, integrity and independence of the illustrious parent
court.104

Congress divided the former Fifth Circuit essentially because
of its size in geography, population, docket, and judgeships. And
the creation of the new Eleventh Circuit arguably allowed for a
"more stable circuit law, a better functioning en banc
court,... improved collegiality, less travel, more efficient
administration, and improved [capability] of the judges to keep
up with the law of the circuit."'0 5 Redrawing the circuit
boundaries, however, did absolutely nothing to relieve the press
of the caseload. The new Fifth Circuit reached the predivision
crisis level of filings in less than five years."°6 Before the two
new courts were ten years old, Chief Judge Charles Clark of the
Fifth Circuit chronicled the region's relentless docket growth:

Fifth Circuit precedent, although appellees urged further that the en banc court
overrule the controlling decision of the former court. This the court declined to do. Id.
at 1211-12.
102. Id. at 1211.
103. See Michael L. Chapman, Appellate Procedure Under the New Eleventh Circuit
Rules, 18 GA. ST. B. J. 134 (1982).
104. H.R. REP. No. 1390, supra note 78, at 4237.
105. BARROW & WALKER, supra note 3, at 246-47.
106. Speech by Gilbert Ganucheau, Fifth Circuit Appellate Advocacy Seminar (Oct.
13, 1984), reprinted in 2 Fifth Circuit Rep. 301 (1985).

1992]

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Since this is a joint conference [of the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits], I thought it may be interesting to compare where
the circuits began in 1981 and where they are now. In the
district courts, pending civil cases in the 5th Circuit
increased 60% since 1981. They presently total 36,871. In the
11th Circuit, the increase has been 48% and the present total
is 19,530. Criminal cases in the district courts in the Fifth
Circuit have increased by an astounding 280% to the present
total of 4,343. The 11th Circuit criminal case increase has
been almost as dramatic: 188%. Pending criminal cases now
total 3,539 pending cases. Pending bankruptcy cases in the
5th Circuit increased 108% to their present level of just over
100,000 while the 11th Circuit's pending bankruptcy cases
increased 79% to the present-day total of 93,514. In the
Courts of Appeals, pending cases in the Fifth rose by 35% to
the present total of 2,955, while the 11th Circuit experienced
a 44% increase in pending cases to a total of 3,171.107
Before the end of the Eleventh Circuit's first decade, the
Eleventh Circuit Judicial Council reached the point of passing a
formal and unanimous resolution in March 1989 asking Congress
not to add any more circuit judgeships, despite statistical
caseload justifications, because that court of appeals simply
would grow too large.'08
The division of the Fifth Circuit thus did not perform any
lasting miracle. At least some members of Congress have come to
recognize that the technique of splitting circuits has an inevitable
downside. It irreversibly lessens the "federalizing function of
courts of appeals. " "' Subdividing courts of appeals is a limited
strategy and a reform that simply does not work.' The largest
courts of appeals today with the largest problems-the District of
Columbia, the Second, and the Ninth Circuits-practically resist

107. Chief Judge Charles Clark, Remarks at the 1989 Judicial Conference of the
Fifth and Eleventh Judicial Circuits in New Orleans, La. (May 8, 1989).
108. Chief Judge Paul H. Roney, Remarks at the 1989 Judicial Conference of the
Fifth and Eleventh Judicial Circuits in New Orleans, La. (May 8, 1989); Letter from
Chief Judge Paul H. Roney to Ralph Mecham, Director of the Administrative Office of
U.S. Courts. (Mar. 2, 1989).
109. Wisdom, supra note 21, at 788; Wright, supra note 6, at 974.
110. Gee, supra note 14, at 806 ("[A]re we to continue the splitting process until it
becomes mincing, with a United States Court of Appeals for the Houston
Metropolitan Area?").
111. See Carrington, supra note 6, at 587 (1969); Hellman, supra note 23, at 1192-

1237.
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any feasible division."' This is the larger lesson to learn from the
Reorganization Act of 1980.
In the abstract, dividing circuits might be more feasible if the
entire national geographical scheme could be redrawn, the
approach always rejected as too unsettling. This would permit an
initial levelling of caseload and judgeships. We might have
twenty circuits of nine judges organized with roughly equal
caseloads under a completely redrawn system of boundary
lines." 2 This symmetry would be gained, however, at a high
cost in disruption. Much federalizing influence of the courts of
appeals would be lost. The balkanized precedent of the law of the
circuits would be worsened without any compensating
improvements. More circuits multiply intercircuit conflicts, and
the resulting hegemony of national law is one of the principle
banes of the federal appellate court system." 3 If circuitsplitting is a bad idea, circuit-mincing is even worse. The cure is
worse than the disease, for circuit-splitting does not solve the
problems of one circuit and merely postpones solution of the
problems of two. Former Chief Judge Goodwin of the Ninth
Circuit summed up the lesson learned from the division of the
Fifth Circuit, during the recent debate over whether to divide his
own court:
Splitting the Ninth Circuit, or other circuits, would not
address the real problem facing the Federal Courts of
Appeals. The problem is not structure, but workload.
Creating more regional circuits would not diminish the work,
but merely divide it. The number of cases that must be heard
by three-judge panels nationwide would remain the same and
continue
to grow no matter how many new circuits are
11 4
formed.
This is why circuit-splitting has fallen into disrepute with wouldbe reformers." 5 This is why the Eleventh Circuit, which owes
112. See The Hon. Alvin B. Rubin, Views from the Lower Court, 23 UCLA L. REV.
448, 459 (1976).
113. Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for a New National
Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1404-09 (1987).
114. Alfred T. Goodwin, Splitting the Ninth Circuit-No Answer to Caseload Growth,
OR. ST. B. BULL., Jan. 1990, at 10, 11; see also Baker, supra note 4. The proposal to
divide the Ninth Circuit has been reincarnated in this Congress. S. 1686, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1991). See generally RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE-INNOVATIONS OF THE
NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (Arthur D. Hellman ed.,

1990).
115. See generally REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE (April 2,
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its origin to the problems of bigness, likely will continue to grow
bigger in caseload and eventually in judgeships for some time to
come.

1990); Report of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Federal
Judicial Improvements, The United States Courts of Appeals: Reexamining Structure
and Process After a Century of Growth (1989).

